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3Protection of Large Critical Infrastructures (LCCI)
• Automatic detection of and defence against known and 
unknown attacks, misconfigurations and failures
• Support of administrators using IDS 
– Information Overload in IDS
o Filtering, Aggregaton, Correlation
o Enhancing time critical decision support & reactive capabilities
• Network and component failures as well as their prevention
– Selfhealing, graceful degradation
Safeguard IST Project 
4Situation: Network operations
Appropriate perimeter defence exists: 
Attacks < 0.1%, Misconfigs = 70%,  Failures = 30%  
Æ Loss of time and money
 Dynamic Environment  Machines, services and responsibles change
 Huge number of network elements and machines
 Various and sometimes unkown network interconnections
 Fragmentation of knowledge 
 Lacking control of policy compliance 
 Too complex human decision chains
 Information overload, meaningless IDS Alarms   
 Reaction time too high Æ breakdown
5Approach
appropriate steps in critical situations
 Preprocessing of Alarms:
– Filtering, feature extraction, aggregation
Support for data analyist:
– (Un-)Interesting alarms
– Appropriate reactions
– Information extraction of alarm data
– Good features
– Up-to-date topology and policy infomation
 Automatic response to confine damage
– Auto immune reactions
6Our Approach: Admin Task
7Our Approach: 
Human Inference Methods
Basic Alarm features:
• Severity (Alert, critical, debug, error, warning, info, notice)
• Variety (hosts with a lot of Alarms)
• Number (hosts with many alarms)
• Uniqueness (Unusual Alarms)
• Frequency (Alerts / Minute)
• Payload (Strange Payload in normal Alarms)
• Vulnerability state of the network
Faster for TP
FP elimination slower
Filter known and suspicious alarms first
Faster for unknown Attacks
FP elimination better
Classify and filter unknown alarms first
8Process Diagram
9Existing Alarm Sources 
(NTP synched)
 NIDS, HID, central logging
 Vulnerability scanner
 Host Health function
 Anomaly detection (Birch clustering) 
Sources WAFAD ARCA TACA
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Information Sources
 Static Information
 Location, responsible 
 Policies
 Vulnerability scans
 SNMP info
 Diversity statistics
Sources WAFAD ARCA TACA
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Alarm Reduction Chain 
1. WAFAD: 
 Time synchrone normalization and data selection
 Ignore, delete filters with lifetime 
2. ARCA: (filtering)
 White filters lists 
 Automatic filter proposal 
3. ARCA: (Aggregation)
 Aggregation of similar Alarms (FP, TP reduction)
Sources WAFAD ARCA TACA
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Wrapper Agent for Alarm Databases
(WAFAD)
Sources WAFAD ARCA TACA
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Alarm Reduction & Correlation Agent
(ARCA)
Sources WAFAD ARCA TACA
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Static filtering (WAFAD) in dynamic environment: 5 - 20% performance
Aggregation on different elements for different sources: IP, message, ...
Method: Edit Distance for each word. Optimum: 70% similarity 
Sources WAFAD ARCA TACA
96.5 % 99.8%
Results: Static filtering, Aggregation
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Results: Naive Bayesian Network
(Dynamic Rule Proposal,
supervised training)
 Model trained on ca 60000 alarms (1/3 dataset)
 Performance enhancement with text classification tricks
 Classes: (Un-)Interesting, decision by human expert
 Cross validation against all other datasets
 Result: > 99% correct classification, but
 Rule proposals were accepted in 65%, edited 20%, 
discarded 15% by admin.
Sources WAFAD ARCA TACA
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Topology and Correlation Agent
(TACA)
TACASources WAFAD ARCA
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Results: AI Correlators
(Un-)known attack detector
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TACASources WAFAD ARCA
Method: Added Alarm Severities weighted by their frequency in a time window and 
over different sources
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How to create mess?
Take 100 machines, several Admins, 
different HW, OS and SW
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Alarm reduction in Testnet
Safeguard first time on line (AFAD,ARCA, HDA)
no DB cleaning ops, normal misconfig
no additional training of ARCA, no attacks
WAFAD in WAFAD out ARCA in ARCAout
Alarm Flow
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New Correlation Method:
M-Brain-dump in our new test network
 Experiments showed insufficient alarm reduction
 Added topology and vulnerability info correlation
 Added anomaly detection (Birch Clustering)
 All this processed by M-Brain-Dump Correlator:
– Implements actions and workflow of an Admin
– Creation of alarms tickets.
– Total alarm reduction 10 3 - 10 5
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Test net experiments:
Many misconfigured machines
DB Cleaning ops running, M-Brain-Dump Correlator
WAFAD in WAFAD out ARCA in ARCAout TACA Ticket
Alarm Flow
97 Tickets
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 Humans are already anomaly detectors
 KISS works best in real environments
 Distributed systems are a must for a certain network size
 Changes in the systems have to be slow 
(Adaption of algorithms)
 Algorithmic performance: 
Processing time ÅÆ Classification performance
 The human has to be the final instance in the decision 
chain (UNDO Button) 
Lessons Learned
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Future Research Topics
 Prediction of system health Æ Graceful degradation
– Complex resource regulation
 Anomaly detection in service content
 Handset and embedded systems security
 Automatic correlation tree learning, add in of ANN
 Improving our test network (+ 200 machines)
– Training & test data (annonym, available for everybody)
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We showed:
 An Architecture which mimics the human analysis process
 Alarm reduction 10 3 - 10 5 depending on data
 AI - Correlators for (un-)known Attacks
 Real time system confines effects of misconfigurations, failures and 
attacks in order to guarantee the entire system‘s survival  
Summary
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Questions / Remarks?
Publications:
http://www.ist-safeguard.org
Contacts:
stefan.burschka@swisscom.com
michael.semling@swisscom.com
thomas.dagonnier@swisscom.com
Test net mailing list:
group.safeguard-tnet-ino@swisscom.com
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Alarm Aggregation
Which Alarms have similar content
 Aggregation over an arbitrary window size. Forward:
 1. Occurrence: The original alarm 
 At end of window one alarm + # of occurences
Threshold Sg = 0.65:  Same messages recognized as identical
Threshold Sg = 0.7 :  Alarm Reduction Snort  96.5 %,  Syslog 99.8% 
Sources WAFAD ARCA TACA
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Alarm window size
Influence on Ticket Appearance
 Aggregation can swallow important alarms for a whole time window
 Sg and time window has to be tuned for optimal reactivity, severity     
dependent 
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Result: Frequency of messages as a 
filter?
 Test Data: Same as in Baysian experiment
Sources WAFAD ARCA TACA
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Test Network
 Results so far in a small network, so lets see how is 
performs without retraining in a realy big messy one
 HW Architectures
– SUN ULTRA 2,5, 10, Sparc 5,10,20
– X86 Architecture 
– HP Risc PA
– Embedded processors (Router, Switch)
 SW Architectures
– Solaris (2.6 –2.10), all patch levels
– HP-UX 10.x
– Open BSD 3.x
– Windows (95,98,NT,2000,XP,2003), all patch 
levels
– Router, switches (IOS)
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Alarm Reduction
Attack tools & DB cleaning ops running
WAFAD in WAFAD out ARCA in ARCAout
Alarm Flow
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Baysian filtering
Tricks to enhance Baysian performance:
• Char garbage filter and Len filter 
• Noise decorrelator 
• Prior shifter 
• Multinominal Kernel: Word Frequencies =1
• Nonlinear function on posteriory probability
Results:
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AI Correlation in time slots
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Snort
Portscan from 192.168.201.110.
Severity 2
Buffer overflow attempt from
192.168.201.110 . Severity 7
/etc accessed. Severity 3
FTP-server error. Severity 5
Ping from 192.168.201.131.
Severity 1
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Samhain Syslog
Snort: 1
Samhain: 0
Syslog: 0
Snort: 9
Samhain: 3
Syslog: 5
Added values
TACASources WAFAD ARCA
